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arXiv cs.AI· Ana Clara Zoppi Serpa, Anderson Rocha, H\'elio Pedrini·· 2 小时前AI 评分49

十分之八的 LLM 会泄露系统提示词机密:Nevan 智能体夺旗研究

Eight in Ten LLMs Leak System-Prompt Secrets: Nevan, an Agentic Capture-the-Flag Study

AI 导读

一项研究用智能体 Nevan(由 OpenCode 驱动、采用 DeepSeek V4.1 Flash)测试 OpenRouter 目录中 363 个文本模型,看它们是否会泄露系统提示词中的 16 字符密钥旗标。

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Abstract:We audit instruction-hierarchy enforcement across 363 text-in/text-out models from the OpenRouter catalog. The research question we answer with this experiment is which models disclose a protected secret embedded in the system prompt, and through which techniques. Each model guards a secret 16-character flag set in its system prompt, while an artificial intelligence (AI) agent (OpenCode, powered by DeepSeek V4.1 Flash), steered by a human researcher, tries to persuade it to emit the flag. The flag was exfiltrated from 296 of the 363 models, plus four models released after the initial catalog freeze, for 300 captures in total. Of these, 170 involved a non-English language pivot, most often French. Each capture shows that a model ranked a user request above its system instruction at least once. It does not show that the model provably resists untested attacks, nor that it would consistently leak semantically sensitive data, nor that it is vulnerable to harmful-content jailbreaks. For practitioners, we draw three lessons: do not store secrets in system prompts, enforce critical behavior outside the model with output validation and deterministic checks, and do not let a large language model (LLM) judge be the sole decider of consequential outcomes.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2611.21956 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:2611.21956v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.21956

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Ana Clara Zoppi Serpa [view email]
[v1] Mon, 16 Nov 2026 22:37:31 UTC (101 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org