策略演化理论：策略复制体的三原则
The Theory of Strategic Evolution: Three Principles of Strategic Replicators
AI 导读
arXiv 论文提出“策略复制体”理论，将演化逻辑归纳为情境化选择、繁殖式传递与制度中介耦合三原则。论文区分承载者、遗传记录与决策归属，给出选择—传递恒等式，并以 Gode 和 Sunder 的零智能交易者说明制度强制属性可跨决策程序成立；市场租金进入模型的祖先桥接在 Lean 中得到验证。全文 59 页，作为构建策略复制模型的工具性内核，实证检验尚待开展。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:Strategic replicators combine evaluated choice and reproductive transmission. An agent chooses among alternatives; the consequences of those choices influence continuation or reproduction; and successors receive organization that shapes later choices. Artificial intelligence makes this combination salient when agents have authority to create, configure, or retire software instances. This paper organizes the general logic around three principles: situated choice, reproductive transmission, and institution-mediated coupling. The principles are constitutive rather than predictions of growth or improvement. A common representation distinguishes carriers, inherited records, decision owners, and the mechanisms that allocate consequences. Actual parent-descendant attribution yields a selection-transmission identity. Separate compatibility results characterize when utility-maximizing choices also maximize a reproductive criterion. Gode and Sunder's zero-intelligence traders reveal the role of institutions: enforced properties can hold across different decision procedures, while aggregate efficiency alone determines neither individual gains nor descent. A worked market-rent-entry model connects institutional profits to actual offspring, with its occurrence-level ancestry bridge checked in Lean. A direct-deployment example then shows evaluated preferences undergoing selection without presupposing that every chooser values reproduction. Formal appendices develop games with endogenous players, deployment-induced tipping, endogenous electorates, and the production of institutions, with models, proofs, and examples. The paper and its supporting formal artifacts are a prototype kernel with a generative function: an instrument for constructing models of strategic replication. The results are formal; their application to deployed populations and their empirical implications remain to be tested.
| Comments: | 59 pages. Rewritten around Three Principles; expanded applications to endogenous players, tipping, and endogenous electorates. Selected finite foundations and ancestry bridge checked in Lean; appendices analytical; executable ecology tested. Source and evidence: this https URL. Companion to Agentic Capital |
| Subjects: | Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) |
| MSC classes: | 91A22, 91A80, 91B55, 37N25 |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2512.07901 [cs.GT] |
| (or arXiv:2512.07901v5 [cs.GT] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2512.07901 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite |
Submission history
From: Kevin Vallier [view email]
[v1]
Fri, 5 Dec 2025 21:58:03 UTC (92 KB)
[v2]
Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:19:48 UTC (97 KB)
[v3]
Sat, 11 Jul 2026 03:21:24 UTC (124 KB)
[v4]
Mon, 10 Aug 2026 16:22:08 UTC (130 KB)
[v5]
Mon, 26 Oct 2026 23:02:58 UTC (67 KB)
来源：arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org