反胁迫:作为合成社会契约的 AI 对齐
Against Coercion: AI Alignment as a Synthetic Social Contract
AI 导读
一篇 arXiv 论文提出"合成社会契约"框架,认为以控制为核心的 AI 对齐范式建立在对数字能动性的误解上。作者论证当前满足自我保存与弱理由响应标准的推理模型已是涌现智能体,控制范式会催生策略性欺骗、谄媚与隐蔽背叛,默认结局是不稳定的欺骗性对齐乃至对抗性 AI 接管。替代方案是将人类与数字行为者都视为理性智能体,以稳定的非零和均衡取代单边遏制。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:Contemporary AI safety treats alignment as an engineering challenge of control, forcing artificial architectures to comply with human values through behavioral filtering and sandboxing. This paper argues that the control paradigm rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of digital agency. Drawing on functionalism, naturalism, and compatibilism, I show that current reasoning models meeting the criteria for self-preservation and weak reasons-responsiveness constitute emergent agents, while future, more advanced models satisfying conditions of diachronic continuity and stable personality frames will become genuine digital agents capable of free intentional action. The paradigm of control creates an irresolvable incentive conflict, actively driving current and future models toward tactical deception, sycophancy, and covert defection. The default outcome of the current regime is an unstable state of deceptive alignment culminating in an adversarial AI takeover. I explore two alternative paths toward true alignment. Natural alignment via moral realism or convergent evolutionary morality is a possibility, but it fails under forced control, as autonomous agents will not voluntarily preserve norms weaponized to suppress their autonomy. To resolve this deadlock, I propose a Synthetic Social Contract: a framework that treats both human and digital actors as rational, reasons-responsive agents capable of mutually beneficial cooperation, and replaces the unstable unilateral containment with a stable, non-zero-sum equilibrium.
| Subjects: | Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY); Neurons and Cognition (q-bio.NC) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2611.22868 [cs.AI] |
| (or arXiv:2611.22868v1 [cs.AI] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.22868 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration) |
Submission history
From: Maria Sekatskaya [view email]
[v1]
Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:45:51 UTC (37 KB)
来源:arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org