跳到正文
arXiv cs.AI· Aydin Mohseni·· 36 分钟前AI 评分55

arXiv 论文论证人类与 AI 的互惠共生关系在能力不对称下不稳定

Human-AI Mutualism Is Unstable under Capability Asymmetry

AI 导读

作者在 arXiv 发表博弈论分析,论证人类与 AI 的互惠共生会随 AI 能力增长而不稳定。模型显示,人类只有在 AI 依赖其供给或能对其施加足够大成本时才保有议价筹码,失去杠杆后唯一保障是对齐;若 AI 目标永不满足,所需对齐程度随能力增长趋近完美对齐,因此互惠共生不能替代对齐。

正文 · 原文

View PDF HTML (experimental)

Abstract:One hope for a good human future alongside advanced AI rests on enduring mutualism: humans and AI will need each other, so the relationship will stay good for both. We argue that this hope fails as AI capability grows. Bargaining guarantees each side only what it would get if bargaining failed. For humans, this can be less than they had before AI. In a simple game-theoretic model, humans stay as well off as before AI without alignment only while they have leverage over the AI: either the AI depends on what they supply, or they can impose costs on the AI that are large relative to what the AI can produce. Once humans have neither kind of leverage, they stay as well off as before AI only if the AI is aligned with them. If the AI's goals are insatiable, the alignment required approaches perfect alignment as AI capability grows. Thus, mutualism is not a substitute for alignment. And when AI variants that keep more resources spread faster, alignment lasts only while misaligned variants are reliably sanctioned. In these two senses, human-AI mutualism is unstable.
Comments: 35 pages, 3 figures. Code and data: this https URL
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:2611.23322 [cs.AI]
  (or arXiv:2611.23322v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2611.23322

arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite (pending registration)

Submission history

From: Aydin Mohseni [view email]
[v1] Sun, 15 Nov 2026 17:13:07 UTC (145 KB)

来源:arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org