Whiteout:缓解大语言模型个人隐私数据泄露的新工具
Mitigating Private Data Leakage in LLMs with Whiteout
AI 导读
一篇 arXiv 论文提出 Whiteout 工具,在个人提出请求后,用精确设计的混淆样本覆写大语言模型中记忆的个人敏感信息(如出生日期、电话、住址),阻止模型复述。该工具在包括一款广泛使用的 OpenAI 模型在内的多种模型上验证,能有效阻止目标信息泄露,对模型效用与安全性影响可忽略,效果优于现有方法(如机器遗忘)。它还经受住了越狱等黑盒攻击以及再学习、量化等白盒自适应攻击的测试。
正文 · 原文
Abstract:Modern large language models (LLMs) are trained on massive, largely unfiltered datasets, including content scraped from nearly every accessible website and user inputs. As a result, LLMs often memorize and reproduce personally sensitive information (PSI) such as birth dates, phone numbers, and home addresses. This leads to significant privacy risks, particularly for high-profile individuals such as executives, politicians, and judges. Existing mitigations largely rely on machine unlearning. However, these methods often remove more information than needed, degrade model utility and safety, and are highly vulnerable to attacks.
This paper presents Whiteout, a practical tool that, upon requests by individuals, prevents LLMs from regurgitating their genuine PSIs, by overwriting them using precise and carefully designed obfuscation samples. We evaluate Whiteout on modern LLMs of varying sizes and makers, including a widely-used OpenAI model. Results show that Whiteout effectively prevents disclosure of the targeted PSIs, has negligible impact on model utility and safety, and outperforms existing alternatives. We also test Whiteout against a wide range of countermeasures, from black-box attacks like jailbreaking to white-box adaptive attacks like relearning and quantization. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on the security and ethical implications of Whiteout.
| Comments: | v2: minor typos and formatting corrections |
| Subjects: | Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) |
| Cite as: | arXiv:2610.02418 [cs.CR] |
| (or arXiv:2610.02418v2 [cs.CR] for this version) | |
| https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2610.02418 arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite |
Submission history
From: Anna Yoo Jeong Ha [view email]
[v1]
Thu, 1 Oct 2026 19:40:38 UTC (1,325 KB)
[v2]
Tue, 10 Nov 2026 01:50:25 UTC (1,341 KB)
来源:arXiv cs.AI · arxiv.org